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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSIE LEON, : 
Appellant, : Priority Classification 
No. 14b 
vs. 
SUSAN PHILLIPS, : Civil No. 870226 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court 
Davis County, Judge Douglas Cornaby 
I. AUTHORITY 
This appeal was brought under the authority of Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(1). 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a final judgment and denial of a 
motion for new trial in of the District Court of Davis County, 
State of Utah. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
A, Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
refusing to grant the Plaintiff a one and one-half hour con-
tinuance to secure her next witness? 
B. Was the trial court's refusal to grant the con-
tinuance prejudicial error? 
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
ORDINANCE 
Rule 40, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule ol, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
The case arose when the Plaintiff claimed to have been 
injured by the Defendants negligent driving. 
The case was filed in the Second District Court in 
Davis County, and proceeded to a jury verdict for the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff claims an abuse of the trial count's 
discretion in denying a continuance to call a witness and alleges 
error in the denial of a motion for new trial based on the denial 
of continuance. 
B. Course of Proceedings and relevant dates. 
Plaintiff filed her complaint on March 19, 1984. A 
three day trial began on February 5, 1987. 
C. Relevant Facts. 
Plaintiff alleged that she was injured on September 3, 
1983 when a truck driven by the Defendant struck the side of a 
motor home as the Plaintiff was climbing into the motor home in 
the parking lot of an Albertson's Super Market in Layton, Utah. 
A jury trial commenced in the case on February 5, 1987 
and continued for three days. 
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Three independent witnesses testified that the impact 
occurred and that they had given the licence number of the truck 
which hit the motor home to a policeman. The officer also 
testified that the license number given him by the witnesses 
matched the plates on the Defendant's truck, and that the 
Defendant admitted to him that she was present in the truck at 
the alleged time and place. 
The Defendant at trial admitted to being in the parking 
lot and to driving past the motor home, but claimed that she did 
not strike it with her truck. 
On the second day of trial the Plaintiff allowed Dr. 
Nord, Defendant's principal medical witness, to testify out-of-
turn during the course of the Plaintiff's case. The last morning 
of trial, Plaintiff's counsel completed the questioning of a 
witness approximately 10:30 a.m. and then informed the court that 
Dr. Tedrow, another witness called by the Defendant, was in the 
courtroom and that counsel had agreed that Dr. Tedrow cculd 
testify that morning. Defendant's counsel then informed the 
court that he did not wish to call Dr. Tedrow at that time. The 
court then requested Plaintiff to proceed with Plaintiff't> case. 
Plaintiff's counsel informed the court that, because of his 
agreement to let Dr. Tedrow testify out of turn that morning, 
Plaintiff had not scheduled her next witness, a rehabilitation 
expert, until after the noon recess. 
The court then ordered Plaintiff to either rest or to 
immediately call Plaintiff's next witness. Plaintiff moved the 
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court for a one and one-half hour continuance to procure Plain-
tiff's next witness. The court then denied Plaintiff's motion 
for continuance and again ordered the Plaintiff to either call a 
witness or to rest. The Plaintiff then rested her case under 
protest. The Defendant then called Dr. Tedrow to the stand. 
After the noon recess, the case was submitted to the 
jury and, after deliberating, the jury returned a verdict for the 
Defendant. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict, 
and the Plaintiff appeals from that judgment and from the denial 
of a motion for new trial. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by denying 
Plaintiff's motion for continuance. The denial left the Plain-
tiff without an important witness whose testimony was relevant to 
the issue of liability and was a denial of Plaintiff's substan-
tial rights to justice. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE TESTIMONY FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF SOUGHT THE CON 
TINUANCE WAS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY. 
Alan Heal, the rehabilitation expert Plaintiff sought 
to call as the next witness, would have testified concerning 
Plaintiff's vocational impairment from her injuries. (See 
proffer of evidence, Record at P 3.) If believed, such testimony 
would have tended to make plaintiff's claim of injury more 
credible. 
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The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants truck struck 
Plaintiff's motor home injuring the Plaintiff. The Defendant 
claimed no other theory of defense. The jury's verdict that the 
Defendant was not negligent, therefore, was a finding that the 
collision did not occur. 
Mr. Heal?s testimony would have supported Plaintiff's 
contention that she was injured. Any testimony tending to make 
Plaintiff's claim of injury more credible would also tend to 
support the alleged collision. 
POINT TWO: THE COURT'S DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE WAS INCONSIS-
TENT WITH SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
A similar case was decided by the Kansas Supreme Court 
in Slavenburg v. Bautts, 561 P.2d 423 (Kansas 1977). 
In Slavenburg, the Defendant was denied a contmuaiiCe 
to call a iredical witness. 
The case arose out of an automobile accident in Kansas. 
The fact of the accident was not contested at trial, but the 
defendant denied that the Plaintiff had been injured and alleged 
that any disability pre-dated the accident. 
At the end of the second day of trial, tht Defendant 
informed the court that he could not call his next witness unti.1 
1:30 p.m. the following day. He explained to the court that the 
Defendant had allowed witnesses to be called out of order to 
accommodate the Plaintiff, and that the doctor could not come 
earlier than 1:30 p.m. The court then ordered the defendant to 
present evidence beginning at 9:00 a.m. the next morning. 
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When Defendant had no witnesses in court at 9:00 a.m. 
the following morning, the court announced to the jury that the 
defendant had rested its case. The defendant appealed from an 
adverse verdict. 
The Kansas Supreme Court quoted from an earlier case 
the following pertinent reasoning: 
It is the duty of litigants to exercise great 
diligence both in prosecuting and in defending actions 
in court, and, as there are usually many cases set for 
hearing at each term of the district courts, the 
orderly dispatch of the business and the protection of 
other litigants from expensive delays and accumulating 
costs make it the duty of the court strictly to require 
the parties to every action to be ready foi trial 
promptly at the time the case is set for hearing or to 
prove that in the exercise of due diligence they have 
been unable to do so. So great is the necessity for 
the prompt dispatch of court business that the statute 
authorizes courts to and they generally do impose upon 
the unfortunate litigant who, even through no fault of 
his own, is unprepared to proceed at the time set all 
the costs of the necessary delay. This is usually 
sufficient to insure the making of every reasonable 
effort to be ready at the time appointed, unless 
vexation and delay to be the real object of the 
litigation or unless some real or fancied advantage may 
accrue to one party by a course of procrastination. In 
such cases of designed obstruction or in the case of 
gross or reckless infection, if the fault be on the 
part of the plaintiff, it may become the duty of the 
court to dismiss his action; if the defendant be at 
fault he may be penalized by proceeding with the trial 
notwithstanding his unieadmess. 
"The incidents of life, however, refuse to conform 
themselves to the plans of any man or to march in 
regular procession on the order of any court or earthly 
power. Even death steps in at the most unanticipated 
times to stay proceedings. It should be borne in mind 
that mere order and regularity of proceeding are not 
the purpose for which courts exist and are held, but 
are only aids to the grand purpose of dispensing 
justice, and should not be carried to the extreme and 
become the cause of injustice. xExtreme justice is 
injustice.'" 
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Bane v. Cox, 88 P. 1083, at PP. 185, 186 
The court then noted further that: 
The power to grant a recess is inherent within the 
trial court's power to control the orderly movement of 
cases within sound judicial discretion...This includes 
the right to deny or grant a recess due to the absence 
of a witness. Exercise of this discretion, however, 
demands consideration of many factors. In ruling on a 
motion to recess because a witness is unavailable the 
court must consider and balance factors including 
counsel's diligence and effort to gain attendance of 
the witness, the reason the witness is not present, the 
nature of the witness's expected testimony, whether the 
testimony is critical evidence or merely cumulative, 
the amount of the delay expected, the effect of the 
delay on the docket of the court, and the overall 
injustice which might result if the delay were denied. 
Having objectively considered the foregoing balancing 
factors, we believe a new trial should be granted. 
Slavenburg at P. 428 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that ruling and judgment not be disturbed unless it appearb that 
the ruling appears to be "inconsistent with substantial justices" 
and must effect the ''substantial rights of the parties." 
In Rowley v. Graven Eros and Co., 491 P.2d 1209 (Utah 
1971), this court set fortr. the following test: 
"The test to be applied is: Was there error or ir-
regularity such that there is a reasonable likelihood 
to believe that in its absence there would have been a 
result more favorable to (the appellant)? 
The Appellant, of course, cannot know or prove the 
effect of the omitted testimony on the outcome of the trial. 
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The Plaintiff wishes the court to know that she cannot 
afford a transcript of the complete trial. While she knows that 
a transcript would be very helpful to the court in surveying the 
whole evidence, she respectfully asks the court to consider the 
undisputed evidence set forth in her statement of the facts. 
She firmly believes that justice and fairness require a 
new trial with a full and fair opportunity to call the witnesses 
of her choosing. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The denial of a opportunity to call a important witness 
was a denial of Plaintiff's substantial rights. 
The trial court's denial of Plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial shculd be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 1938. 
HELGESEN & WATERFALL 
JACK C. HELGESEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Robert G. Gilchrist, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, P.O. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84110, postage prepaid, this day of April, 1988. 
Secretary 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROSIE M. LEON# 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUSAN PHILLIPS, 
Defendant* 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 35305 
This action came on for jury trial before the court 
and jury, with the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, presiding, 
and the issues having been duly presented and tried, and the 
jury having answered the special verdict form, and having found 
that the defendant, Susan Phillips was not negligent, and 
therefore that there was no cause of action, that 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
plaintiff take nothing, that the action be dismissed on the 
merits, with each party to bear their own costs of this action. 
FILMED 
DATED this „•? day of /fsrrA 1987. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was nailed, first class, postage 
prepaid on this 44+*- day olJjtfJjtfUJtAtJ^ 1987, to the 
following counsel of record: (J 
Jack C. Helgesen 
HELGESEN & WATERFALL 
2650 Washington Blvd, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 'JLMJ. : i-:.-;i\ 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROSIE M. LEON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUSAN PHILLIPS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No.: 35305 
The plaintiff's motion for a judgment not 
withstanding the verdict, having been orally presented to the 
court, on February 9, 1987, with the plaintiff being present 
and represented by her counsel of record Jack C. Helgesen, 
and the defendant being present and being represented by her 
counsel of record Robert G. Gilchrist, and the court having 
heard argument, and reviewed the matter, that 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion is 
denied. 
FILMED 
DATED this ^ . day of y ^ „ / 1987, 
BY/THE COURT: 
fORABLB' DOUGDHh-L. CORNABY 
District Court Judge / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
on this £0*^ day of ^^MSULOJUU 1987, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Jack C. Helgesen 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROSIE LEON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUSAN PHILLIPS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No.: 35305 
The plaintiff's motion for a new trial having been 
filed with the court, and defendant having responded with a 
brief, and the court having reviewed the matter pursuant to 
Rule 2.8, that pursuant to the grounds stated in the court's 
ruling on motion for new trial dated May 6, 1987, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial is denied. 
DATED this j?^— day of 
^ 1987. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage 
prepaid on this /J5**" day of <-Wu. , 1987, to the 
following counsel of record ofl/Vf 
Jack Helgesen 
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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JACK C. HELGESEN 
HELGESEN & WATERFALL, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4768 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 479-4777 
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DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
ROSIE M. LEON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SUSAN PHILLIPS, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 35305 
Notice is hereby given that ROSIE M. LEON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, hereby appeals to the Utah State 
Supreme Court from the final judgment entered in this 
action on the 22nd day of May, 1987. 
DATED this \<ftr day of June, 1987. 
HELGESEN & WATERFALL 
*£L 
JACK7 C. HE#&ESEN 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
FILMED 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid, 
this IA day of June, 1987 to the following: 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Secrel 
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